In spite of its title, Hegel's Science of Logic does not seem to be a work in logic at all. Clearly, its ambitions go well beyond those of formal logic, the area of philosophy traditionally concerned with the nature of valid argument. For this reason, the Logic is more commonly considered a work of metaphysics, one whose primary aim is to defend an account of the fundamental nature of reality. Hegel himself certainly appears to present it that way when he introduces the work as a critical survey of different "definitions of the Absolute" (EL § 85). In the course of this survey, definitions from nearly all of the great figures of Western metaphysics are considered: for example, Spinoza's substance, Aristotle's actuality, Parmenides's Being, Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, and so on. Since Hegel's case for his own definition of the Absolute will take the form of a critique of virtually all preceding ones, the Logic will also provide us with a purified reconstruction of the entire history of philosophy. This historicalreconstructive aspiration has no parallel in logic as we usually know it. As if further confirmation of its distance from formal logic were needed, Hegel's speculative logic has a religious dimension. As is well known, Hegel also understands his own definition of the Absolute to be reflected in the Christian religion, especially in its conception of God. He will therefore often describe his project in unabashedly theological terms, calling it "the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit" (WdL 21:34/SoL 29). Finally, and as this last passage suggests, there is the role of speculative logic in Hegel's larger system ("The Encyclopedia"). I
