This study analyzes the disarmament policy of successive British governments from 1919 to 1934, concluding that the policy-makers' strategy was to avoid their international obligations for as long as possible.
In the aftermath of the Great War, multilateral disarmament was placed at the top of the international agenda by the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. This book analyzes the naval, air and land disarmament policies of successive British governments from 1919 to 1934, articulating their dilemma either to fulfil their obligations or to avoid them.
Daring and controversial, the present study challenges the hitherto accepted view that Britain occupied the high moral ground by drastically reducing its armaments and argues that, during this period, British disarmament policy was reactive and generally failed to provide the leadership that this extremely sensitive time in international politics demanded.
'This is an important addition to the secondary literature on inter-war disamarmament' - Contemporary British History
